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ABSTRACT
The doctrine of equivalents is arguably one of the most
important aspects of patent law. The protection a patent confers is
meaningless if its scope is determined to be so narrow that trivial
changes to a device bring it out of the bounds of the patent. One of
the greatest challenges courts and legislatures therefore face in
patent law is to create rules for determining patent scope that
maintain the protection a patent is meant to confer while still
keeping the patent monopoly within reasonable bounds. Despite
the general unity in patent laws among developed countries, the
difficulty of this task has led to different results in different
jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have chosen to determine patent
scope under a doctrine of equivalents, while others have
maintained the position that adequate scope can be found within
the meaning of a patent’s claim. Even jurisdictions which agree
that a doctrine of equivalents should apply differ significantly in its
application. This Article provides an examination of four patent
jurisdictions—the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany,
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and Japan—and their separate answers to the question of patent
scope. This Article does not purport to decide which jurisdiction
has the right solution, but merely points out that different solutions
can be and have been found for the question of equivalents.
Although a traditional case of patent infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents may find protection under all four
jurisdictions, the laws of these countries start to diverge on
questions regarding after-arising technology, the essential
elements of a patent claim, and equivalents that clearly fall outside
the language of a claim. One cannot answer the question, “Does
anybody have it right?” without first considering these issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most jurists the world over would concede that determining
patent scope is one of the most difficult aspects of patent law. It is
no wonder then that there are considerable differences in attitudes
towards the doctrine of equivalents"a doctrine that is often central
to the issue of patent scope"in different jurisdictions as it permits
a court to find infringement even when the accused device or
process is not literally covered by a valid claim of the patent. This
Article will consider and compare such differences from the
perspective of four key patent jurisdictions: the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan.
In this Article, each jurisdiction is tackled separately by
experts within that jurisdiction, and then their analysis is woven
into one cohesive whole by posing the question: “Does anybody
have it right?”
II. THE UNITED STATES
A.
Judicial Underpinnings for the Doctrine of
Equivalents
The United States patent laws are found in Title 35 of the
United States Code. Section 271 deals with infringement.
However, a careful review of § 271 shows that it only codifies the
statute on literal or textual infringement. The doctrine of
equivalents is the result of case law, not statute.
The doctrine of equivalents has its roots in the United
States Supreme Court decision in Winans v. Denmead.1 The patent
in Winans described a railcar with a conical cavity for carrying
coal, resulting in an even weight distribution of coal in the car and
a lower center of gravity. The accused railroad car had octagonal
and pyramidal cavities instead, thus providing the same result as
Winans’s railcar without falling within the literal language of
Winans’s patent.2 The trial court found no infringement, but a
sharply divided Supreme Court found infringement, applying the
following logic:
The exclusive right to the thing patented is not
secured if the public are at liberty to make
substantial copies of it, varying its form or
proportions. And, therefore, the patentee, having
described his invention, and shown its principles,
and claimed it in that form which most perfectly
embodies it, is, in contemplation of law, deemed to

1
2

56 U.S. 330 (1853).
See id. at 340.
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claim every form in which his invention may be
copied, unless he manifests an intention to disclaim
some of those forms.3
After the development of a modern claiming system, the
doctrine of equivalents was firmly established in American law by
the landmark decision of Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co.4 (Graver Tank II). This case guided the
United States doctrine of equivalents for almost the entire latter
half of the twentieth century. The patent in Graver Tank II
involved a welding process and claimed a welding flux5 containing
a major proportion of alkaline earth metal silicate.6 The preferred
embodiment disclosed in the patent was a flux that included a
mixture of silicate of calcium and silicate of magnesium. The
accused flux also used silicate of calcium, but substituted silicate
of manganese (a non-alkaline earth metal), for silicate of
magnesium. However, the patent specification taught that
manganese, the metal used by the infringer, could be substituted
for magnesium.
The Court found that, although the accused flux did not
infringe the claimed invention literally, it did infringe under the
doctrine of equivalents. The Court indicated that “[t]he essence of
the doctrine [of equivalents] is that one may not practice a fraud on
a patent.”7 The Court explicitly likened this “essential” notion of
“fraud on the patent” to the piracy of the “unscrupulous copyist”—
the scoundrel of copyright law.8 According to the Court, “[o]ne
who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who seeks to pirate a
copyrighted book or play, may be expected to introduce minor
variations to conceal and shelter the piracy,” because “[o]utright
and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of
3 Id. at 343.
4 339 U.S. 605 (1950); see Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The
Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not
Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 700-03 (1989).
5
Welding flux is a blanket of molten metal compounds used to protect freshly
deposited molten metal in the welding process, thereby producing sound weld
metal. See Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 167 F.2d 531, 53233 (7th Cir. 1948), rev’d in part, 336 U.S. 271 (1949).
6
The district court found the alkaline earth metal flux claims in question valid
and infringed, but found other flux claims and all welding process claims to be
invalid for technical reasons. See Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co., 86 F. Supp. 191, 199-200 (N.D. Ind. 1947). The court of appeals reversed,
finding all of the claims in issue valid. Linde Air Prods., 167 F.2d 531. The
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the district court’s
decision. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co. (Graver Tank I),
336 U.S. 271 (1949). The Court reheard the case in 1950 in Graver Tank II,
which concerned infringement of the flux claims.
7
Graver Tank II, 339 U.S. at 608.
8
See id. at 607.
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infringement.” 9 Moreover, the Court suggested that only
“insubstantial” changes would be encompassed by the doctrine.10
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the test for infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents: “a patentee may invoke this doctrine to
proceed against the producer of a device ‘if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result.’”11
Noting that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a case more
appropriate for application of the doctrine of equivalents,”12 the
Court affirmed the district court’s finding that the accused flux was
substantially identical in operation and result. The Court focused
specifically on evidence indicating that the prior art disclosed the
use of manganese silicate as an ingredient in welding
compositions, and that those skilled in the art would have regarded
manganese silicate as interchangeable with magnesium silicate.13
Graver Tank II was at the time and remains today a very
unusual case on its facts since the accused flux was both disclosed
and more significantly claimed in the patent, but the claims that
covered the accused flux were held invalid. Hence the Court in
Graver Tank II used the doctrine of equivalents only to expand a
valid narrow claim to cover the accused flux that the inventor
clearly considered to be within his patent claims. These special
facts demonstrate that the public was put on notice in very clear
terms that the inventor considered the accused flux to be an
infringement.
The doctrine of equivalents flourished, with broad
application of the function/way/result test, after Graver Tank II,
although none of the cases involved a patent with a claim covering
the product or process alleged to be an equivalent.14 However,
9

Id. The Court noted that the doctrine applied both to pioneer, or primary,
inventions and to secondary inventions “consisting of a combination of old
ingredients which produce new and useful results.” Id. at 608. According to the
Court, “[w]hat constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context
of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case,” and
“[e]quivalence . . . is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be
considered in a vacuum.” Id. at 609. Although “[a] finding of equivalence is a
determination of fact” and “[p]roof can be made in any form,” the Court stressed
that “[a]n important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would
have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent
with one that was.” Id.
10
See id. at 610.
11
Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42
(1929)).
12
Graver Tank II, 339 U.S. at 612.
13
Id.
14
An extensive discussion of the post-Graver equivalence cases is found in
Adelman & Francione, supra note 4. This article takes the reader to the late
1980s. The authors are still not aware of any case where the alleged equivalent
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nearly fifty years later, the Court chose to reconsider the doctrine
in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.15 In doing
so, the Court held that the doctrine still lived, but it indicated that
every element of a claim is material and the function/way/result
test for equivalents must be applied to each individual element and
not to the claim as a whole.16 In addition, the Court indicated that
each element must not be so construed as to “effectively eliminate
that element in its entirety.” 17 The Court then reaffirmed the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel as a limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents, 18 decided that equivalency should be
decided at the time of infringement,19 and suggested the use of
special questions of interrogatories as a means for dealing with
black box jury verdicts.20 The Court did not attempt to provide a
theory for why the doctrine exists beyond that found in Graver
Tank II.
Although the Supreme Court did not set forth a justification
for the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank II, it seems to have
adopted the justification provided by Federal Circuit Judge Rader.
In a case involving the doctrine of dedication,21 Judge Rader wrote
a lengthy concurring opinion which set forth a theory upon which
to base a sound doctrine of equivalents.22 Judge Rader suggested a
simple principle to incorporate both the doctrine’s notice function,
ensuring that the definition of an invention can be found in its
claims, and it’s protective function, protecting the inventor from
insubstantial variations he could not have thought to include:
“[T]he doctrine of equivalents does not capture subject matter that
the patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the
application process and included in the claims.”23
B. The Unforeseeable Equivalent Rule of Festo
Taking a cue from Judge Rader, the Court in Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.24 essentially adopted his
was covered by an existing patent claim which was subsequently invalidated
thereby forcing the patent owner to use a narrower claim plus the doctrine of
equivalents for its infringement case.
15
520 U.S. 17 (1997).
16
Id. at 29-30.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 32.
19
Id. at 37.
20
Id. at 39.
21
The doctrine that holds that a disclosed but unclaimed embodiment in the
patent cannot be recaptured by the doctrine of equivalents.
22
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056-59
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
23
Id. at 1056.
24
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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foreseeability approach, but only when the inventor seeks to
overcome what otherwise would be a prosecution history estoppel.
The Court recognized that usually a “patentee’s decision to narrow
his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general
disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the
amended claim.”25 However, even if a patentee narrows a claim, he
may rebut the presumption by showing that “at the time of the
amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected
to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the
alleged equivalent.” 26 Specifically, the Court stated that the
patentee can rebut the presumption that prosecution history
estoppel bars a finding of equivalence if:
The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the
time of the application; the rationale underlying the
amendment may bear no more than a tangential
relation to the equivalent in question; or there may
be some other reason suggesting that the patentee
could not reasonably be expected to have described
the insubstantial substitute in question.27
The Court, however, did not explain the meaning of the
phrase “a tangential relation to the equivalent in question.”28 It also
did not explain when “there may be some other reason suggesting
that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have
described the insubstantial substitute in question.”29 As for the
latter condition, no subsequent case has found it a basis for
overcoming the presumption and nobody in the literature has
proposed even a hypothetical situation where it would apply.30 As
for “tangential,” it is totally devoid of linguistic content as applied
to patent law instead of geometry or differential calculus. It
apparently came out of nowhere (probably the result of a law
clerk’s feeble attempt at making a contribution to the law). The

25

Id. at 725.
Id.
27
Id. at 740-41. Afterwards, the Federal Circuit held that “the time when the
narrowing amendment was made, and not when the application was filed, is the
relevant time for evaluating unforeseeability, for that is when the patentee
presumptively surrendered the subject matter in question and it is at that time
that foreseeability is relevant.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1365 n.2 (Fed Cir. 2003) (en banc).
28
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740.
29
Id. at 740-41.
30
The Federal Circuit has suggested that this criterion “may be satisfied when
there was some reason, such as the shortcomings of language, why the patentee
was prevented from describing the alleged equivalent when it narrowed the
claim.” Festo, 344 F.3d at 1370.
26
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Federal Circuit has found that an amendment was tangential in
only a very few cases.31
More importantly, the Court did not explain why this
reasonably foreseeable approach to the doctrine of equivalents
should only apply to amended claim elements. 32 After all, an
applicant normally considers the same legal and factual issues
when deciding how to draft her originally filed claims as when
deciding whether to amend claims during prosecution. In Celltech
Chiroscience Ltd. v. MedImmune Inc.,33 Lord Justice Jacob, one
the world’s leading patent jurists, had to decide an infringement
question under U.S. patent law. In the course of doing so, he
commented on the Court’s explanation for its approach to
overcoming an estoppel:
Perhaps of most significance in this case, even if
file wrapper estoppel did not apply, is the
observation that “the patentee . . . may be expected
to draft claims encompassing readily known
equivalents.” Does this apply also to unamended
claims? Suppose, for instance, an unamended claim
which says “nailed.” And suppose screwed, riveted
or glued would do just as well. Are those
equivalents not covered by the doctrine of
equivalents? Putting it another way is it only
unforeseeable equivalents which are now covered
by the doctrine?34
Lord Justice Jacob therefore recognized an inherent
inconsistency in the doctrine of equivalents in the United States as
currently understood. If there is a prosecution history estoppel with
respect to a claim element, then the only equivalent permitted for
such an element is one that is not reasonably foreseeable, i.e. most
often an after-arising equivalent unless somehow the estoppel was
tangential. In short, it is unforgiving of patent attorney errors made
during the prosecution of the patent if they result in the narrowing
of claim elements, but not of patent attorney decisions made during
the drafting of the originally filed claims.
The unforeseeable equivalents rule in Festo brings about
other inconsistencies in United States law as well. The current
function/way/result tripartite test is a test for determining
equivalency applying an element-by-element analysis. However,
31

See the concurring opinion of Judge Rader in Cross Medical Products, Inc. v.
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 480 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader,
J., concurring), which discusses the two cases that have found that the
amendment was tangential and explaining why this requirement was unwise.
32
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41.
33
[2002] EWHC 2167 (Pat.) (Eng.).
34
Id. ¶ 18.
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Festo brings out a weakness in this test.35 The way prong, in many
cases the most contentious issue for the determination of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, 36 represents the
“order” (i.e., the interrelationship in time space, dimensions, etc.37)
of the elements.38 An element that is the product of an after-arising
technology and adapted for use in a product or process would
likely result in a different “order,” particularly spatial arrangement,
among the elements of the product or process. Arguably, a
potential infringer of a claimed product or process could
circumvent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents by
replacing an element in an accused product or process with an
element that is the product of an after-arising technology.
C. Conclusion
In any event, it is clear that in the United States an element
subject to a prosecution history estoppel is subject to the
reasonably foreseeable limitation whereas an element that is not
may be expanded by any known or unknown equivalent. Whether
the United States will adopt the reasonably foreseeable approach
for all limitations is for the courts in the future to decide. At
present there is no reason to believe that the current approach that
differentiates limitations based on whether or not they are subject
to a prosecution history estoppel will be changed.

35

See Raj S. Davé, A Mathematical Approach to Claim Elements and the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 507, 540-43 (2003).
36
See Adelman & Francione, supra note 4, at 687-88 (“In Pennwalt, as in most
equivalents cases, there was no dispute that the accused device performed
substantially the same overall function or work and achieved substantially the
same overall result. In most cases, the issue is almost invariably whether the
accused device performs the overall function in substantially the same way as
the claimed invention.” (citations omitted)).
37
See Davé, supra note 35, at 534.
38
See id. at 537.
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III. THE UNITED KINGDOM39
A. Introduction
In Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., 40 the
ruling decision of the House of Lords, Lord Hoffmann was openly
skeptical of the U.S. doctrine of equivalents remarking that
“American patent litigants pay dearly for results which are no more
just or predictable than could be achieved by simply reading the
claims.” Lord Hoffmann argued that giving claims a “purposive”
construction eliminates any need for a doctrine of equivalents.
While the late Sir Hugh Laddie argued that Lord Hoffmann
misread prior English precedents, even he conceded that current
English law does not provide for any protection against
“equivalents”.41
This chapter examines the “purposive construction”
approach under English law and the contours of Article 69 of the
European Patent Convention (EPC), with which English law is
meant to comply. It finds that under the current English approach
where the need to provide adequate notice of patent breadth to the
public is balanced against fair protection to the patentee, a claim
cannot be read literally, but is to be construed purposively in
accordance with the specification and drawings. The law clearly
states that in order for a variant or an equivalent to infringe, such
variant or equivalent must fall within the language of a claim. In
other words, an equivalent that does not fall within the language of
a claim, however interpreted, is not caught, despite the fact that
such variant may amount to nothing more than an unfair copying
of the very essence of the inventive concept.
The chapter then examines the amended language of the
EPC2000 (which came into force in 2007) and argues that it is
unlikely to change the law governing equivalents in the United
Kingdom.

39

This chapter was begun by Lord Justice Pumfrey, who unfortunately passed
away in December 2007. It was completed by Shamnad Basheer. While great
efforts were taken to adhere to the key structure outlined by Justice Pumfrey, the
author has, at times, strayed to bring in other issues that deserve discussion,
including the contours of Article 69 of the European Patent Convention, and the
prospect of changed interpretation in the light of EPC 2000. See Convention on
the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), art. 69, Oct. 5,
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 275-76 [hereinafter EPC], available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ma1.html.
Mr.
Basheer wishes to thank Justine Pila and Duncan Curley for their helpful
comments on this section.
40
[2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 44.
41
Hugh Laddie, Kirin Amgen—The End of Equivalents in England?, 40
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW
[IIC] 3, 6 (2009) (F.G.R.).
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B. Drafting Difficulties
A discussion of equivalents should start with the difficulties
confronted by the draftsman, particularly where the rule is “first to
file” rather than “first to invent.” Speed (coupled with secrecy) is
everything. Once the invention is made, it is of the greatest
importance to file an application as soon as possible. A patent
attorney is confronted with an invention. He must discuss it with
the inventor. He must rely on his own knowledge of the technology
and the guidance he receives from the inventor and others to draft a
document that must, if it is to form the basis of a valid claim to
priority, contain an enabling disclosure of the invention. 42
Appropriate claim categories must be decided on, and all this must
be done in the knowledge that one cannot subsequently amend the
patent specification to add subject-matter. At the same time, the
patent attorney will wish to secure as wide protection as possible
having regard to the state of the art, because that is his basic
function. So the burden on the draftsman is a heavy one.
The task of the draftsman will thus be to draft claims as
wide as possible without bumping into the prior art, but at the same
time to disclose the features of the invention with differing degrees
of generality to provide, if necessary, stages in the inevitable
narrowing of the claims during prosecution. The result will be
dictated by one consideration above all else: how wide is it
possible to claim having regard to the state of the art. In this
drafting process, it is hardly surprising that draftsmen will use
words of degree, and perhaps for fear of the examiner, will fail
fully to generalize features of the invention as widely as the state
of the art may justify. Of course, they may just be bad at their job.
These difficulties indicate that the perfect patent claim will
often remain an unattainable ideal. Thus most patent jurisdictions
agree that the law ought not to penalize omissions in drafting,
particularly when such an omission spurs a competitor to
appropriate the essence of an invention through minor variants that
may not technically fall within the strict literal wordings of a
claim. However, the tests laid down by courts for determining
when such variants are likely to fall within the scope of a patent
monopoly, despite omissions in drafting are allegedly different.
The United Kingdom’s test takes the form of a “purposive”
construction approach that is more limited in scope than the
corresponding doctrine of equivalents in the United States.

42

Compare Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 5 (priority date), id. § 14 (making of
application), id. § 14(3) (adequacy of disclosure), and id. § 15 (date of filing
application), with European Patent Convention art. 78, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M.
268 (requirements of the European patent application), id. art. 80 (date of filing),
id. art. 83 (disclosure of the invention), and id. art. 88 (claiming priority).
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C. Summary of the English Approach
There are two versions of the history of the English
approach to equivalents. One is that laid out by Lord Hoffmann in
Kirin-Amgen. 43 The other is described by the late Sir Hugh
Laddie. 44 However, both agree that the doctrine of purposive
construction articulated by Lord Diplock in the famous Catnic
case 45 represents the current law. 46 Given that Lord Hoffman’s
views were expressed in his judicial capacity sitting in the House
of Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom, this view will
hold sway insofar current English law in this regard.
In Amgen, Lord Hoffman not only endorsed the Catnic
approach as a correct statement of the English position, but also
claimed that it conforms to the EPC mandate on claim
interpretation.47
1. Catnic
In Catnic, the invention pertained to a “steel girder” lintel
used in the construction of doors and windows. The claim required
that the upper plate be supported upon the lower plate by two rigid
supports, one in the front and the other “extending vertically” from
the one plate to the other at the rear.48 The defendant deployed a
lintel with a rear support that was inclined six or eight degrees
from vertical.49 The House of Lords ruled that this variation had no
material effect upon the load-bearing capacity of the lintel or the
way it worked and that this would have been obvious to the skilled
builder at the date of publication of the patent.50 Importantly, it
also held that the skilled reader would not have understood the
claim to mean that the patentee was insisting upon precisely ninety
degrees as an essential requirement of his invention. The court
therefore concluded that “extending vertically” meant extending
with the range of angles which give substantially the maximum
load-bearing capacity and of which ninety degrees is the perfect
example”.51 The court stated:
A patent specification should be given a purposive
construction rather than a purely literal one derived

43

Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] R.P.C. 9.
See Laddie, supra note 41.
45
Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183 (H.L.).
46
See Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, ¶¶ 42-45; Laddie, supra note 41, at 1011.
47
Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 44.
48
Catnic, [1982] R.P.C. at 240.
49
Id. at 241.
50
Id. at 244.
51
Id. at 244.
44
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from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal
analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by
their training to indulge. The question in each case
is: whether persons with practical knowledge and
experience of the kind of work in which the
invention was intended to be used, would
understand that strict compliance with a particular
descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was
intended by the patentee to be an essential
requirement of the invention so that any variant
would fall outside the monopoly claimed, even
though it could have no material effect upon the
way the invention worked.52
2. Improver
In Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd.,53
Mr. Justice Hoffmann (as he then was) restated Lord Diplock’s
purposive construction approach as a sequence of three questions
to be asked whenever the alleged infringement fell outside the
“primary, literal or a contextual meaning” of the word or phrase in
question:
(1) Does the variant have a material effect upon the
way the invention works? If yes, the variant is
outside the claim. If no—
(2) Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material
effect) have been obvious at the date of publication
of the patent to a reader skilled in the art. If no, the
variant is outside the claim. If yes—
(3) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless
have understood from the language of the claim that
the patentee intended that strict compliance with the
primary meaning was an essential requirement of
the invention. If yes, the variant is outside the
claim.54
Improver is one of a series of cases 55 involving
infringement of a European patent corresponding to the U.S. ‘772
patent56 that covered a motorized depilatory known as the Epilady.
It essentially used a coiled spring attached at both ends to a motor.

52

Id. at 243.
[1990] Fleet Street Reports [F.S.R.] 181 (Pat. Ct.).
54
Id. at 189.
55
A list of all of the cases may be found in John Gladstone Mills III, A
Transnational Convention for the Acquisition and Enforcement on International
Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 958, 960 n.10 (2006).
56
U.S. Patent No. 4,524,772 (filed July 22, 1983).
53
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The motor drives one end of the spring clockwise and the other end
counterclockwise and the rotating curved spring pulls out hair. The
Epilady was a great commercial success. The accused device sold
under the name Smooth and Silky was the subject of the ‘375
patent. 57 It essentially substituted a plastic (rubber) tube with
grooves for the coiled spring. It was specifically designed to
improve on the Epilady design.58
A key issue in the application of the Improver questions
was how one was to determine obviousness for purposes of
answering the second question. Mr. Justice Hoffman opined thus:
In my view the question supposes that the skilled
man is told of both the invention and the variant and
asked whether the variant would obviously work in
the same way. An affirmative answer would not be
inconsistent with the variant being an inventive
step. For example, the choice of some material for
the bendy rod which was a priori improbable (e.g.
on account of its expense) but had been discovered
to give some additional advantage (e.g. painless
extraction) might be a variant which obviously
worked in the same way as the invention and yet be
an inventive step. Nor would it matter that the
material in question, being improbable, would not
have suggested itself to the skilled man as an
obvious alternative. Questions such as these may be
relevant to the question of construction (Lord

57

U.S. Patent No. 4,726,375 (filed Mar. 30, 2987).
The independent claim of the European patent corresponding to the ‘772
patent reads:
An electrically powered depilatory device comprising: a hand
held portable housing (2); motor means (4, 4’) disposed in said
housing; and a helical spring (24) comprising a plurality of
adjacent windings arranged to be driven by said motor means
in rotational sliding motion relative to skin bearing hair to be
removed, said helical spring (24) including an arcuate hair
engaging portion arranged to define a convex side whereas the
windings are spread apart and a concave side corresponding
thereto wherea[s] the windings are pressed together, the
rotational motion of the helical spring (24) producing
continuous motion of the windings from a spread apart
orientation at the convex side to a pressed together orientation
on the concave side and for the engagement and plucking of
hair from the skin of the subject, where by the surface
velocities of the windings relative to the skin greatly exceed
the surface velocity of the housing relative thereto.
Improver, [1990] F.S.R. at 185 (quoting language from the patent).
58

275

THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN VARIOUS PATENT REGIMES—DOES
ANYBODY HAVE IT RIGHT?

Diplock’s third question) but not at this stage of the
inquiry.59
Another important aspect of the case is the court’s
treatment of the third question which focuses on the intent of the
inventor as evidenced by the patent specification. Therefore, it
provided a basis for a court to decide not to expand a claim on the
theory that the patentee did not want the claim to be so expanded.
That is precisely what Mr. Justice Hoffmann did in Improver with
respect to question three, where he refused to expand the claim
even though the specification indicated that equivalents were
included.
Thus interpreted, I do not think that “helical spring”
can reasonably be given a wide generic construction
and I accept Dr. Laming’s reasons for thinking that
a skilled man would not understand it in this sense.
This is not a case like Catnic in which the angle of
the support member can be regarded as an
approximation to the vertical. The rubber rod is not
an approximation to a helical spring. It is a different
thing which can in limited circumstances work in
the same way.60
3. Amgen: The End of the Improver Questions?
The last Improver question asks if the skilled person might,
even if the variant works in obviously the same way as the
patented invention, still construe the patent claim in a narrow
manner such that the variant is excluded from its ambit. One is
hard pressed to see why one has to necessarily go through the two
earlier Improver steps in all cases before asking this critical third
question, which amounts to nothing more than asking: how would
a skilled person have construed the term? Put another way, in
many cases, it is far more economical to go directly to the third
question, which in essence is what the Catnic purposive
construction approach is all about.61 This logic is evident on the
facts of Improver itself. Mr. Justice Hoffman ought to have simply
asked: would the skilled person have construed the term “helical
spring” as used in the patent specification to include a rubber rod?
The answer is likely to have been a clear no.
And this is precisely what Lord Hoffman did in Amgen, by
which time he had been elevated to the House of Lords, the highest

59

Id. at 192.
Id. at 197.
61
Of course in some cases, it is not possible to “purposively construe” without
asking the first two questions
60
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court in the United Kingdom.62 He strongly cautioned that the
Improver guidelines were not to be ritualistically applied in every
case.63
One can see parallels between Lord Hoffman’s subsequent
approach to the Improver guidelines and the U.S. Supreme court’s
view of the “suggestion motivation teaching” test evolved by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to determine the
obviousness or otherwise of an invention. 64 In both cases, the
courts warned against a dogmatic application of the standard or
guideline in question, stipulating that while they might help in
some cases, other cases could be resolved using the usual tests
developed by earlier case law.
In some cases, the first two Improver questions may help
one construe the claim in accordance with what the skilled person
might have thought. But here again, although the variant may not
materially impact the manner in which the patented invention
works and this is obvious to a person skilled in the art, the said
variant must fall within the language of the claim. In other words,
the first two questions by themselves, without the third, might
bring English law closer to the U.S. position which permits
protection against an equivalent that falls outside the language of a
claim.
The facts of Amgen are as follows. Of the thirty-one claims
in the Amgen patent,65 only three were treated as relevant. These
claims (1, 19 and 26) can be briefly summarized as follows:
Claim 1: A DNA sequence for use in securing the
expression of erythropoietin (EPO) in a host cell,
such sequence selected from tables in the patent or
related sequences;66
Claim 19: EPO which is the product of the
expression of an exogenous DNA sequence, and
which has a higher molecular weight by the ‘SDS-

62

See Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005]
R.P.C. 9, ¶ 48 (“The Catnic principle of construction is therefore in my opinion
precisely in accordance with the Protocol.”).
63
See id. ¶ 52 (“The limits to the value of the guidelines are perhaps most
clearly illustrated by the present case . . . .”). For a good discussion of some of
the cases that applied the Improver questions, see Jenkins, Trade Mark and
Patent Attorneys, Court of Appeal Gets to Grips with the Protocol,
http://www.jenkins.eu/pi-autumn-2002/court-of-appeal-gets-to-grips-with-theprotocol.asp
64
See KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
65
See European Patent No. 0148605B2 (filed Dec. 12, 1984); Kirin-Amgen,
[2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 12.
66
Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 13.
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PAGE’ testing method than existing EPO derived
from extraction from urine;67 and
Claim 26: EPO which is the product of the
expression in a host cell of a DNA sequence
according to claim 1.68
It must be noted at this juncture that the issue of
infringement of the DNA sequence itself (claim 1) never arose
directly, as the alleged infringement was by importation of the
EPO product"the subject matter of claims 19 and 26. However it
did arise indirectly, since claim 26 referred back to claim 1.69
The key issue in determining the scope of the patent was
the construction of the term ‘host cell’ as used in claim 26 (and
claim 1).70 In order to understand the court’s resolution of this
issue, it is important to appreciate the difference underlying the
two technologies. While Amgen’s process for the manufacture of
EPO relied on an exogenous DNA sequence coding for EPO
(which was introduced into the host cell), the TKT method
involved gene activation of an endogenous DNA sequence by an
exogenous upstream control sequence.71
On the evidence, the House of Lords concluded that the
skilled person would not regard TKT’s process using an
endogenous coding sequence to produce GA-EPO as involving a
‘host cell,’ required by claim 1.72 Consequently, TKT’s GA-EPO
was not an EPO falling within claim 26. Similarly, the court held
that GA-EPO was not “the product of … expression of an
exogenous DNA sequence’ within claim 19, and so there was no
infringement under this claim as well.”73
Much in line with its principle of construction outlined
earlier, Lord Hoffman made it abundantly clear that this is where
the analysis should end. The claim had been construed
‘purposively’, and on the facts there was no infringement. He
specifically disapproved of any further attempt to apply the
protocol questions over and above that construction.74
4. After-Arising Technologies
As to whether or not a variant created using an after-arising
technology is likely to infringe under the purposive construction

67

Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 15.
69
Id.
70
Id. ¶ 53.
71
Id. ¶ 10.
72
Id. ¶¶ 58, 80.
73
Id. ¶ 58.
74
Id. ¶ 70.
68
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approach depends upon the level of generality of the claim in issue.
Illustratively, consider a claim that used the term “electronic
storage device” and had been published during the era of CDs,
when DVD technology was not yet known. It is reasonable to
suggest that the term “electronic storage device” ought to be
construed to include DVD technology as well. As Lord Hoffman
noted in Amgen:
I do not dispute that a claim may, upon its proper
construction, cover products or processes which
involve the use of technology unknown at the time
the claim was drafted. . . . In the present case,
however . . . the man skilled in the art would not
have understood the claim as sufficiently general to
include gene activation. He would have understood
it to be limited to the expression of an exogenous
DNA sequence which coded for EPO.75
In other words, unless the claim is general enough to cover
variants that deploy after-arising technology, without running the
risk of being invalidated for lack of sufficient disclosure or
enablement,76 it may not be possible to construe such a claim to
include the said variant. What makes the issue of after-arising
technology more difficult to cover in the English context is the fact
that the skilled person is to construe the claim as on the date of the
publication of the patent application.77 Therefore, such person does
not have the benefit of the after-arising technology with which to
construe such a claim and thereby to include a variant within its
scope.78

75

Id. ¶ 53.
See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 14(5)(c) (U.K.), which tallies with the EPC,
supra note 39, art. 84, 1065 U.N.T.S. at 279, and requires that “[t]he claim or
claims shall be supported by the description.” Of course, the lack of enablement
would not impact the scope of the claim during a “purposive constructive”
assessment, but may result in the claim being invalidated separately.
77
The second Improver question asks: “Would this (i.e. that the variant had no
material effect) have been obvious at the date of publication of the patent to a
reader skilled in the art[?]” Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd.
[1990] F.S.R. 181, 189 (Pat. Ct.).77
78
Lord Justice Jacob, a leading English IP judge is also unsympathetic to the
idea of protecting an unforeseeable equivalent. See Lord Justice Jacob, Claim
Construction and Equivalents: A Paper for the Shanghai IP Symposium (July
2008)
(manuscript
at
5-6),
available
at
http://121.199.41.177/QBPC/uploads/download/Claim%20Construction%20and
%20Equivalents%20_by%20Justice%20Jacob.doc.
76
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D.

The EPC and Protocol: Delineating the Contours

Lord Hoffman categorically asserted that the modern
English approach to the interpretation of claims and infringement
(as articulated by the Catnic “purposive construction” approach) is
in conformity with Article 69 of the EPC and the corresponding
Protocol.79 This statement assumes tremendous significance, given
that English law cannot travel beyond the bounds of the EPC.
Consequently, there are limits to any potential expansion of the
purposive construction approach to accommodate variants or
equivalents.
Article 69 EPC has two parts: a substantive part, and a
‘Protocol’ (agreement) on its interpretation. The substantive part
states that “[t]he extent of the protection conferred by a European
patent or a European patent application shall be determined by the
terms of the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings
shall be used to interpret the claims.”80
The Protocol then goes on to elaborate:
Article 69 should not be interpreted as meaning that
the extent of the protection conferred by a European
patent is to be understood as that defined by the
strict, literal meaning of the wording used in the
claims, the description and drawings being
employed only for the purpose of resolving an
ambiguity found in the claims. Nor should it be
taken to mean that the claims serve only as a
guideline and that the actual protection conferred
may extend to what, from a consideration of the
description and drawings by a person skilled in the
art, the patent proprietor has contemplated. On the
contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining a position
between these extremes which combines a fair
protection for the patent proprietor with a
reasonable degree of legal certainty for third
parties.81
In so far as English law is concerned, section 125 of the
Patents Act, 1977 mirrors Article 69:
(1) [A]n invention for a patent for which an
application has been made or for which a patent has
been granted shall, unless the context otherwise

79

Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 30.
EPC, supra note 39, art. 69(1), 1065 U.N.T.S. at 275, available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar69.html.
81
European Patent Convention, Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69, art.
1, Nov. 29, 2000, available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legaltexts/html/epc/2000/e/ma2a.html.
80
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requires, be taken to be that specified in a claim of
the specification of the application or patent, . . . as
interpreted by the description and any drawings
contained in that specification, and the extent of the
protection conferred by a patent shall be determined
accordingly.
...
(3) The Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69
of the European Patent Contention . . . shall . . .
apply for the purposes of subsection (1) above as it
applies for the purposes of that Article.82
In order to appreciate the import of Article 69, as
interpreted by the Protocol, consider the following categories:
(i) Where the literal meaning of a term used in the claim is
not clear:
In such a case, the straightforward principle of claim
construction that is followed in European countries and indeed in
most other jurisdictions around the world is to look to the
specification and drawings to interpret the claim. Illustratively, in
Catnic, one might argue that the import of the term “vertical” was
not clear from the claims. Therefore, it could either be construed as
“ninety degrees” or as something distinct from horizontal and
therefore “representing a close range of degrees that was close to
ninety degrees.” One would then look to the specification and the
drawings, which made it clear that the patentee did not intend to
restrict the term to only ninety degrees, but wished to include a
range of degrees close to ninety degrees.83
(ii) Where the literal meaning of a term used in the claim is
clear. However, when one looks to the specification and
drawings, another meaning appears:
In such a case, Article 69 as interpreted by the Protocol
demands that the term should be invested with the meaning that
emerges from the specification and the drawings. One might argue
that the Catnic “vertical” usage falls within this category, as
opposed to the earlier one discussed above. In other words, the
term vertical used in the claims would have strictly meant ninety
degrees. This is buttressed by the fact that the patentee used the
term “substantially horizontal” in the same claim and omitted to
use the term “substantially” in relation to “vertical.”84

82

Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 125 (1977) (Eng.).
Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183, 244.
84
Id.
83
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However, on an examination of the specification and the
drawings, a person skilled in the art was likely to appreciate that
the absence of the qualifying term “substantially” was inadvertent
and that the term “vertical” meant a range of degrees close to
ninety degrees. Under the EPC and the protocol, it is this reading
of the claim that must prevail. In other words, although the literal
meaning may be clear, one cannot interpret it in clinical isolation
and must necessarily look to the specifications and drawings. This
category best exemplifies the essence of the “purposive
construction” doctrine.
(iii) Where the literal meaning of a claim term is clear, and
the specification does nothing to indicate that the term
includes the allegedly infringing variant:
In such a case, both the EPC and English law (which
conform in this regard) are likely to exclude any protection to the
variant. It again bears reiteration that Article 69 stipulates that the
meaning of a term has to be found in the claims.85 And this is
where English law differs from other jurisdictions, which explicitly
recognize a doctrine of equivalents or other similar doctrine, where
one need not necessarily fit the variant within the language of the
claim.
This category is well illustrated in Amgen, where the term
“host cell” used in the claims could not have meant an ordinary
human cell with an exogenous promoter.86 Under English law, the
relevant date for assessing how the skilled person might have
construed the claim is the date of publication of the patent. In
Amgen, as of the date of publication of the patent, TKT’s
endogenous gene activation technology was not yet discovered or
contemplated.87 Consequently, it is difficult to argue that a term
such as “host cell” used in the claim could be taken to include
TKT’s process where no “host cell” was used.
This category exemplifies the outer limits of the purposive
construction doctrine and helps strike a distinction with the U.S.
position, where a variant does not need to be bound to the language
of a claim in order for the patentee to be protected. While
discussing the U.S. doctrine of equivalents, Lord Hoffman opined
that “once the monopoly had been allowed to escape from the
terms of the claims, it is not easy to know where its limits should

85

See EPC, art. 69(1), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legaltexts/html/epc/2000/e/ar69.html.
86
Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005]
R.P.C. 9.
87
Id. ¶ 79.
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be drawn.” 88 Lord Hoffman observed that the Supreme Court’s
worry in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. that
the doctrine of equivalents had “taken on a life of its own,
unbounded by the patent claims” 89 seemed to be true.90
The above categories are not neat divisions and may
perhaps morph into each other. Imperfect as they are, they
demonstrate the analytical distinctions sought to be drawn and help
one to appreciate the import of Article 69 and purposive
construction.
1. EPC 2000
In the light of revisions to the EPC and the use of the term
“equivalents” for the first time, the above interpretation may be
thrown into some doubt. The revisions effected by the European
Patent Convention (EPC 2000) and the corresponding protocol
came into force on December 13, 2007. The amended protocol
now has two parts:
Article 1, the first part, reproduces the existing Protocol
requirement. Article 2, interestingly titled “Equivalents”, states
that, “[f]or the purpose of determining the extent of protection
conferred by a European patent, due account shall be taken of any
element which is equivalent to an element specified in the claims.”
Since Article 2 uses the term “equivalent”, one might ask
whether or not the EPC now protects “equivalents” that lie outside
the language of the claim, but nonetheless fall within the scope of
the inventive concept. It may be noted that neither the term
“equivalent” nor any of the other terms used in this Article (“due
account,” “element,” “specified”) have been defined.
Firstly, it is clear that Article 69, which stipulates that “the
extent of the protection conferred by a patent or a European patent
application shall be determined by the terms of the claims,” would
still reign supreme. It is only the protocol which interprets Article
69 that has changed and not Article 69 itself. As discussed earlier,
Article 69 makes clear that one cannot travel beyond the language
of a claim. This is further clarified by the amended wordings of
Article 69(2) which now states that:
For the period up to grant of the European patent,
the extent of the protection conferred by the
European patent application shall be determined by
the claims contained in the application as published.
However, the European patent as granted or as
amended in opposition, limitation or revocation
88

Id. ¶ 39.
520 U.S. 17, 28-29 (1997)
90
Kirin-Amgen [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 39.
89
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proceedings shall determine retroactively the
protection conferred by the European patent
application, in so far as such protection is not
thereby extended. (Emphasis added).91
If Article 69 does not permit one to travel outside the
language of the claims it is difficult to see how the use of the word
“equivalent” in the Protocol, an inferior explanatory instrument,
might permit one to do so. Perhaps the term “equivalent” only
means that one must consider the possibility of variants, when one
construes a term used in the claim in accordance with the
descriptions and drawings. And this precisely is what Lord
Hoffman stated in Amgen:
Although article 69 prevents equivalence from
extending protection outside the claims, there is no
reason why it cannot be an important part of the
background of facts known to the skilled man which
would affect what he understood the claims to
mean. That is no more than common sense. It is also
expressly provided by the new article 2 added to the
Protocol by the Munich Act revising the EPC, dated
29 November 2000 (but which has not yet come
into force).92
Assuming a court takes an alternative interpretation and
permits variants outside the scope of the claims (category 3
discussed above) in a manner closely resembling the US doctrine
of equivalents, this might lead to some inconsistency in relation to
the law governing amendments to claims. Both the EPC93 and
English law94 (which is meant to conform to the EPC) do not
permit any amendments that extend the scope of the claims. If a
claim cannot be amended during the normal course (either during
prosecution after the date of publication or during infringement
proceedings) in a manner that extends its scope, it would be rather
incongruous to permit a court, during infringement proceedings, to
enjoin an equivalent that falls outside the scope of the claim.
Apart from the above, as Lord Hoffman rightly notes in
Amgen v. TKT, any expansion in patent scope beyond the terms of

91

EPC, supra note 39, art. 69(2), 1065 U.N.T.S. at 275, available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar69.html.
92
Kirin-Amgen [2004] UKHL 46.
93
See EPC, supra note 39, art. 123, 1065 U.N.T.S. at 275, available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar123.html.
94
See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, §§ 27 ("general power to amend specification
after grant") and 75 ("amendment of patent in infringement or revocation
proceedings") (1977) (Eng.).
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the claim would unreasonably expose the patent to claims of
invalidity on grounds of anticipation or insufficiency.95
E. Conclusion
On its face, the purposive construction theory appears to be
blessed with an elegance and simplicity that other theories
governing immaterial variants or equivalents lack. However, as
noted earlier, its key limitation lies in the fact that it cannot protect
an equivalent or variant that lies beyond the language of the
claims. As to whether this is good or bad policy is a moot issue.
Some may argue, as Lord Hoffman did, that it provides more
clarity and is less expensive for litigants than the American
doctrine of equivalents. But does it provide fair protection to the
patentee? So long as the variant in question is in some way
supported by the specification, ought not the patentee to be
permitted to prevent such unscrupulous copying? This concern is
particularly acute when drafting difficulties make it apparent that
the perfect claim is an unattainable ideal.
This is a policy issue that might need to be tackled in a
separate paper altogether. For the moment however, English law
will only protect those variants that fall within the language of a
claim.
The EPC 2000 is unlikely to change much in this regard, at
least in so far as the English courts are concerned. But if it is
eventually read in a manner that permits an expansion of the scope
of a patent to cover variants outside the language of a claim in the
same way as the US doctrine of equivalents, the courts may need
to work out a way to help tether this expansion in some meaningful
way. Otherwise, English courts may find themselves exhibiting the
same anxiety that once afflicted their U.S. counterparts, who in the
Supreme Court decision Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. lamented the fact that the doctrine of equivalents had
“taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims.”96
Only time will tell as to how the tricky issue of equivalents
is likely to play out in the UK. In the meantime, the jury is out as
to which country has the right answer in this regard. If the goal is
to appropriately balance fair protection to the patentee with
adequate notice of patent breadth to third parties, one might argue
that English law does comes close to striking such an optimal
balance.

95
96

Kirin-Amgen [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 47.
520 U.S. 17, 28-29 (1997).
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IV. GERMANY*
A. Introduction
The scope of patent protection in Europe is determined in
large party by Art. 69 of the European Patent Convention (EPC)
for all contracting states.97 Unfortunately, this Article leaves broad
room for interpretation and is not understood in the same way all
across Europe. For this reason, instead of a “final” European
doctrine, this paper only presents the German view on this topic.98
B. Basic Principles of Claim Construction in German
Law
The statutory provisions governing the interpretation of
patent claims and the determination of patent scope in German law
are laconic. As discussed above, Art. 69(1) EPC only defines the
scope of protection conferred by a European patent as being
determined by the terms of the claims, and allows the description
and drawings to be used to interpret these claims. This basic law is
supplemented by the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 as
discussed above.99 The Munich Revision Act of November 29th
2000 uses the text of the old Protocol to create Article 1 of the new
Protocol and adds a new Article 2.
Since the Protocol on the Interpretation is part of the
100
EPC, “equivalents” is becoming a statutory legal term for the
first time. But what are equivalents to elements specified in the
claims? This question is not addressed and is therefore left to be
answered by the courts. We have seen the English approach above
and will now set out how the Bundesgerichtshof101 has defined a
position which according to its assessment combines a fair
protection for the patent proprietor with a reasonable degree of
certainty for third parties.

* Peter Meier-Beck Dr. iur., Judge at the Bundesgerichtshof, Karlsruhe,
Germany, Honorarprofessor at the Heinrich-Heine-Universität, Düsseldorf,
Germany; Max v. Rospatt, Attorney at Law and Partner at rospatt osten pross,
Düsseldorf, Germany.
97
All member states of the European Union, as well as a few more European
states, particularly Switzerland.
98
Section 14 of the German Patent Law (PatG) corresponds almost literally to
Article 69(1) EPC.
99
Protocol, supra note 81.
100
EPC,
art.
164(1),
available
at
http://www.epo.org/
patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar164.html.
101
The Bundesgerichtshof is the Supreme Court for civil and penal matters in
Germany. The author Peter Meier-Beck is a member of its 10th Senate which is
the patent law division.
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The basis for determining the scope of protection is the
interpretation of the patent claim.102 Before answering the question
of whether a patent merits a scope of protection beyond its
wording, there is the question of how this wording of the patent
claim is to be understood. For this understanding, three basic
principles are important:
1.
The understanding of a person skilled in the
art addressed by the patent is decisive. The terms
used in the patent claim are to be interpreted in view
of the understanding of a person skilled in the art,
that is, a person who is active in the technical field
of the invention.103
2.
The person skilled in the art will consider
the technical function of the individual feature of
the patent claim as particularly important, when
trying to understand the terms used in the patent
claim. 104 This is called “function-aimed
interpretation” or “purposive construction.”105 But
when taking this approach, one has to keep in mind
that the understanding of a physically defined
feature must not be reduced to its function.
Otherwise, there is the danger that the difference
between determining the meaning of the wording of
the patent claim and the determination of the scope
of protection becomes unclear by incorporating
equivalents identical in function into the meaning of
the wording of the claim.106
3.
The person skilled in the art will not look at
isolated terms and features of the patent claim, but
will rather try to understand their meaning in the

102

EPC, art. 69(1), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legaltexts/html/epc/2000/e/ar69.html.
103
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 2, 1999, Case No.
X ZR 85/96, as translated in 30 Intellectual Review of Industrial Property and
Copyright Law [IIC] 932, 939 (Spannschraube [Tension screw]).
104
Id. at 939; BGH Nov. 7, 2000, Case No. X ZR 145/98, as translated in 33 IIC
647, 649 (Brieflocher [Letter Punch]).
105
Uwe Scharen, BENKARD, EUROPÄISCHES PATENTÜBEREINKOMMEN
[EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION] 704 (2002); Peter Meier-Beck, The Latest
Issues in German Patent Infringement Proceedings, 2000 Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 355, translated in 32 IIC 505, 511-14
(2001).
106
Friedrich-Wilhelm Engel, The “Wortsinn” of Patent Claims in German Case
Law on Patent Infringement Disputes, 34 IIC 233 (242) (2003); Peter MeierBeck, Aktuelle Fragen der Schutzbereichsbestimmung im deutschen und
europäischen Patentrecht [Current Issues of Identifying the Scope of Protection
in German and European Patent Law], 2003 GRUR 905.
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context of the entire claim and the set of claims,
whereby using the description including cited prior
art and his common general knowledge again to
understand the claim as a whole.107 This is generally
referred to as “context-aimed interpretation.”108 The
meaning of a term determined in such a way does
not necessarily have to correspond with the general
meaning of this term in that field of art. Rather, as
the Bundesgerichtshof puts it: “patent specifications
virtually represent their own lexicon.”109
Interpreting the patent claim according to these basic
principles is referred to generally in case law as “determination of
the meaning of the wording” (Wortsinn) or “determination of the
technical meaning” of the patent claim.110 The interpretation is
solely based on the claim, the claim set, the description, the cited
prior art, and the general common knowledge. The file wrapper is
therefore not considered.111
This level of examination is of profound importance for
patent infringement proceedings: if the contested embodiment
incorporates every single feature of the claim, properly construed,
then the patent is infringed.112 In this case, much like the position
in the United Kingdom discussed above, there is no need to think
about equivalents.
C. Protection of “Equivalents” Under German Law
How is the infringement suit to be decided, if the contested
embodiment does not correspond to the wording of the patent
claim? In Germany and other countries of continental Europe,
there is and has been a near consensus, that, in this case, patent
infringement is not necessarily excluded, and the scope of
protection extends beyond the mere wordings of the claim. One of
the central questions in patent law is therefore how this scope of
protection is to be determined. Where is the border to be drawn
between that area, that is to be reserved for the patentee for the
protection of his or her inventive achievement, and the neighboring
area, which every competitor can use to compete with the
patentee? This issue is closely connected with a second question:

107

Tension Screw, 30 IIC 932.
Meier-Beck, supra note 76, at 511-14.
109
Tension Screw, 30 IIC at 939.
110
BGH June 14, 1988, Case No. X ZR 5/87, as translated in 22 IIC 249, 253
(Ionenanalyse [Ion Analysis]).
111
BGH Mar. 12, 2002, Case No. X ZR 43/01, as translated in 34 IIC 302
(Kunststoffrohrteil [Plastic Pipe]).
112
Ion Analysis, 22 IIC at 253.
108
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how can this borderline be drawn so that it is clearly delineated—
that is how can the scope of patent protection be defined, so that
legal certainty is ensured? Those are exactly the two goals
enshrined in the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the
EPC:113 appropriate protection for the patentee on the one hand,
and sufficient legal certainty for third parties on the other. As
discussed above, the United Kingdom has its own doctrine that, in
the view of its courts, correctly applies the rules provided by the
EPC. Similarly, the Bundesgerichtshof has developed a test for
applying these laws, but the result is not identical to that of the
British courts.
In terms of competition law, defining the border of the
scope of protection means to distinguish two areas: the “open” area
in which the complete or partial imitation of products or product
concepts is a legitimate means of competition, and the “closed”
area in which competitors are forced to use substitutes rather than
copies.114 A focus on this competition-controlling function helps
one appreciate the importance of laying down a clearly discernable
borderline. Unfortunately, optimal discernability of such a
borderline does not easily correspond to the optimal economic
balance between patent protection and freedom of competition. If
the criterion of predictability is treated as absolute, it is very hard
to grant reasonable scope to the patent and to draw this line
appropriately. The scope of protection would be reduced to the
literal wording of the patent claim, thereby permitting easy
circumvention by a third party. When drafting a patent claim, the
drafters’ imagination is usually not sufficient to think about all
possible cases, in which a third person may circumvent the literal
wording of a feature and still appropriate the core aspects of the
invention.
Insofar as Article 2 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of
Article 69 states that the scope of protection conferred by a patent
is to be extended to variants or ‘equivalents’ it only puts in
different words what can now already be derived from Article
69(1) of the EPC. However, neither the EPC nor the Protocol set
out how the scope of protection is to be determined. Article 69(1)
of the EPC only dicates that the patent claims are the main
reference point for defining scope. According to the principles
developed by the Bundesgerichtshof, the patent claims form not
only the starting point, but also the decisive basis for determining

113

Protocol, supra note 81.
BGH July 13, 2004, Case No. KZR 40/02, as translated in 36 IIC 741
(Standard-Spundfass [Standard Tight-Head Drum]).
114
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the extent of protection: protection must align with the patent
claims.115
The fact that incorporating equivalents into the scope of
protection would detract from legal certainty does not mean that
the goal of an easily recognizable borderline should be abandoned
altogether. Article 1 of the Protocol demands a position “which
combines a fair protection with a reasonable degree of legal
certainty for third parties.”116 Therefore, it is the task of the courts
to find criteria for the determination of the scope of protection
which reconcile both demands.
The most pragmatic instrument of choice here is the
cognitive faculties of a person skilled in the art, who is, on the
basis of his knowledge and skill in the art, analyzing the patent
claim and using the description and the drawings to interpret the
claim.117 The scope of the patent is determined by this person’s
conclusions. It extends to any variant that is made obvious by the
claim to the person skilled in the art.118 On the one hand, this has
the effect that the scope of the patent is proportionate to all subject
matter that can be done or carried out by the person skilled in the
art, on the basis of the protected inventive achievement, without
being inventive himself (demand for fair protection). On the other
hand, this extent of protection is (almost) becoming predictable by
focusing on subject-matter, which is recognized by a person skilled
in the art, as being part of the protection conferred by the patent
(demand for legal certainty).
This needs to be explained in more detail. But before doing
that, one “obvious” objection has to be addressed: if a variant
included in the scope of patent protection is obvious to a person
skilled in the art, then why can the applicant not be expected to
explicitly incorporate it into the patent claim? Should he not realize
and include what is obvious?119 This question is understandable,
but it fails to recognize that the average person skilled in the art is
as artificial as the situation, in which he is brought into by us,

115

See BGH Nov. 29, 1988, Case No. X ZR 63/87, 104 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 84, as reprinted in 1989 GRUR
205 (Schwermetalloxidationskatalysator [Heavy Metal Oxidation Catalytic
Converter]).
116
Protocol, supra note 81, art. 1.
117
Id. (mentioning explicitly the “consideration of the description and drawings
by a person skilled in the art” (emphasis added)).
118
Ion Analysis, 22 IIC 249.
119
Judge Rader assumes an obligation of the patentee “to draft claims that
capture all reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the invention” in his
concurring opinion in Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co.,
285 F.3d 1046, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., concurring).
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when we need his advice. 120 When revoking or invalidating a
patent, because the person skilled in the art would have combined
two prior art documents, we are generally not disturbed by the fact
that no existing person skilled in the art has ever really done this—
except the inventor him or herself. 121 And we are not to be
disturbed by this, because otherwise, everything new would have
to be regarded as involving an inventive step. It is no different as
far as the obvious variants are concerned, which would have been
found by the person skilled in the art, even if the applicant had not
thought of them in any way.
In short, the scope of the patent does extend to those
variants which are made obvious to a person skilled in the art by
the patent claim. The scope of the doctrine of equivalents under
German law is now conveniently split up into four questions, as
discussed below.
D. The Four Questions
Schneidmesser I (Cutting Blade I), a fundamental German
case on the doctrine of equivalents, divided the examination of the
scope of protection into a series of questions,122 thereby referring
back to the English model of purposive construction under
Catnic123 and later elucidated by Justice (as he then was) Leonard
Hoffmann in what came to be commonly called the Improver
questions.124
1.
The first question is: Does the modified embodiment
solve the problem underlying the invention by means which have
objectively the same technical effect?125
This question resembles the first Improver question,126 but
it is not identical to it. Nor does it ask about how the invention
“works” or the function-way-result test; rather, it only asks about

120

BGH Sept. 7, 2004, Case No. X ZR 255/01, as translated in 36 IIC 971, 975
(Bodenseitige Vereinzelungseinrichtung [Bottom Separating Mechanism]).
121
According to the could-would test, see, e.g., In re Rider, Case No. T2/83,
1984 Official Journal of the European Patent Office [OJ. EPO] 265, ¶ 7 (EPO
Boards of Appeal, Mar. 15, 1984), available at http://legal.european-patentoffice.org/dg3/biblio/t830002ep1.htm, a novel teaching is considered not
inventive if the man skilled in the art could and would have carried it out.
122
BGH Mar. 12, 2002, Case No. X ZR 168/00, as translated in 33 IIC 873
(Schneidmesser I [Cutting Blade I]).
123
Catnic Components Ltd. v. Mill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 163 (H.L.)
(U.K.).
124
See Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., [1990] R.P.C. 69,
[1990] F.S.R. 181 (U.K.).
125
Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 875 (whether “it solves the problem underlying the
invention with modified but objectively equivalent means”).
126
“Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works?”
Improver, 1990 F.S.R. at 182.
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the result of this effort. The identical result has to be achieved at
least to a practically relevant degree.127 A merely similar effect is
not sufficient.
There is the obvious objection that this question could be
subjected to concerns raised by Lord Justice Robin Jacob with
regard to the first Improver-question, in that the requirement by
Article 69 of the EPC that the interpretation be in the context of the
patent claim is not met. 128 But this is not the case. As the
Bundesgerichtshof has pointed out, a claim-oriented approach is
necessary to decide whether the modified means have the same
effect.129 Only such variants can be said to have the same technical
effect that produce results a person skilled in the art understands to
be so produced from the claims by every single feature and by the
mutual connection of all features of the claim.130 Determining the
technical effect means determining those effects that the person
skilled in the art understands to be the result of the technical
teaching of the claim. For this reason, the first question and the
‘technical matter’ that it seeks to assess are not divorced from the
patent claim. The objective technical correspondence is only
relevant in that it shows up as a correspondence of all effects a
person skilled in the art understands to be the effects of the
inventive technical teaching.131
If the answer to the first question is “no”, the contested
embodiment is outside the scope of the patent. If yes, we move on
to the second question:
2.
Was the person skilled in the art enabled by his
expertise on the priority date to find the modified means as having
the same effect?132
This question is all about excluding those cases in which an
inventive step was necessary to find the modified means as having
the same effect.133
If that is the case, i.e. if the means having the same effect
were not obvious to the person skilled in the art, they are outside
the scope of the patent.134 Because what the person skilled in the
127

BGH June 28, 2000, Case No. X ZR 128/98, as translated in 33 IIC 349, 351
(Bratgeschirr [Roasting Pots]).
128
Lord Justice Jacob, Last Word: A Letter from Justice Jacob, 2003 Patent
World 155.
129
See Roasting Pots, 33 IIC at 350; Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 874-75.
130
Roasting Pots, 33 IIC at 351.
131
See id.
132
See Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 875 (“[T]he person skilled in the art is able to
use his specialist knowledge to identify the modified means as having the same
effect.”).
133
BGH Oct. 24, 1986, Case No. X ZR 45/85, as translated in 19 IIC 243, 24344 (Befestigungsvorrichtung [Fixing Device]).
134
Id.
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art is not able to find and to do based on the patent and helped by
his or her knowledge in the art, is not to be granted to the
patentee.135 Else, the fundamental bargain underlying most patent
regimes is violated"i.e. that a patent is an exclusive right granted
for a limited period in exchange for certain technical teaching
made available by the patentee to the public, by publication of the
patent.
If either questions one or two are answered in the negative,
there is no infringement by equivalents. However, if both are
answered in the affirmative, we still have to ask a third question
before finding for infringement.136 The format for this question is
given by the Bundesgerichtshof in the decision “Schneidmesser I”,
as explained below.
3.
While answering question two, are the
considerations that the person skilled in the art applies drawn from
the technical teaching of the patent claim (so that the person
skilled in the art took the modified embodiment into account as
being an equivalent solution)?137
Why is this third question necessary? Has everything
necessary not been examined already, if the first two questions can
be answered with a “yes”? That is not the case, for the following
reasons: The first “Schneidmesser”-question pertains only to an
objectively identical “technical effect,” i.e., a correspondence in
the result that the invention aims at.138 But this correspondence and
the fact that the person skilled in the art was able to recognize it
without being inventive are not sufficient to bring the modified
embodiment within the scope of protection. If this was only about
including all variants that a person skilled in the art would have
been able to do with the teaching of the patent, then the second
question alone would be sufficient. But there is more at stake here:
This is not only about what the person skilled in the art would have
been able to do on the priority date knowing the patent, but about
what he would have been able to do and would have done on the
basis of the patent (of the patent claim).139 Again, one has to keep
in mind that the exclusive patent right correlates to the invention’s
technical teaching made available by virtue of the patent being
published. That is why the third question is about whether the
considerations, which the person skilled in the art has to make, are
135

BGH May 15, 1975, Case No. X ZR 35/72, as reprinted in 1976 GRUR 88
(89/90) (Ski-Absatzbefestigung [Ski Heel Attachment]) (discussing the
requirement that patents have clear, technically simple claims which can be
deciphered by an expert).
136
See Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 875.
137
See id. at 875.
138
See Roasting Pots, 33 IIC at 350.
139
See Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 876.
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sufficiently close to the technical meaning of the patent claim, i.e.,
whether they are drawn from the patent claim’s teaching to the
person skilled in the art. The technical teaching of the patent claim
has to be the decisive basis for the consideration of the person
skilled in the art, so that he recognizes the variant as an equivalent
alternative to an embodiment which carries out the wording (in
context) of the patent claim.140
This perspective offered by the third question is reflected,
in some part, in the first English Improver question, when asking
about the way the invention works.141 But it is not the same. It is
rather a question of whether the essential considerations needed by
a person skilled in the art to find the variant are sufficiently close
to the patent claim to show an equivalent alternative.142 In the end,
both questions depend on judicial interpretation. However, it
appears that posing these three questions has certain advantages:
on the one hand, the correspondence in the technical effect of the
invention is not subjected to relativization anymore. On the other
hand, the standard for deciding whether a modified means of
attaining the desired technical effect are within the scope of
protection relies specifically on ‘matter’ that the person skilled in
the art is able to get out of the patent claim. And according to the
law, it is the patent claim which determines the scope of the
patent.143
4.
Is the modified embodiment anticipated or made
obvious by the state of the art?144
This question, which is known as the Formstein objection
in German case law, 145 is necessary to prevent a scope of
protection (after the previous three questions have been answered
in the affirmative) that is too broad in comparison to the state of
the art, since it encompasses an embodiment, which—however
rarely it may be the case—lacks novelty or at least was obvious to
a person skilled in the art at the time of patenting.146 It is only the
direct subject matter of the patent application that is examined for
patentability during the grant procedure.147 The Patent Office does
140

See Heavy Metal Oxidation Catalytic Converter, 1989 GRUR (208).
Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., [1990] R.P.C. 69,
[1990] F.S.R. 181 (U.K.).
142
See Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 875.
143
See EPC, art. 69(1), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legaltexts/html/epc/
2000/e/ar69.html.
144
See Cutting Blade I, 33 IIC at 875.
145
See BGH Apr. 29, 1986, Case No. X ZR 28/85, as translated in 18 IIC 795
(Formstein [Molded Curbstone]) (allowing objection for the first time).
146
Id. at 800.
147
See BGH Nov. 7, 2000, Case No. X ZR 145/98, as translated in 33 IIC 647,
648 (Brieflocher [Letter Punch]).
141

294

11 Yale J.L. & Tech. 261

2008-2009

not determine what, having regard to the state of the art, the
adequate scope of protection for the subject matter ought to be.148
Consequently, such a determination has to be made at the stage of
infringement proceedings.
It is pertinent to note that unlike U.S. law, file history
estoppel has no role for the determination of the scope of the
patent. The main reason for this is given in the Kunststoffrohrteil
decision, which states that Article 69 of the EPC does not mention
the file history as a means of interpretation.149 However, this may
not be the only reason. As mentioned in Kunststoffrohrteil itself,
there is no practical need to consider events that took place during
the grant procedure. 150 Either an equivalent solution is not
patentable in view of the state of the art— in which case the
Formstein objection prevents the patentee from being given
protection for it.151 Or, during the grant procedure, the patentee has
assumed erroneously, or has created the impression that an
equivalent solution would not be patentable. In that case, this is
irrelevant, because the grant procedure is only for the purpose of
determining the subject matter of the patent. The scope of the
patent, on the contrary, is to be determined during infringement
proceedings. Therefore, any (faulty) views harbored by the
patentee or mentioned by him during the grant procedure are
without meaning.152
E. Conclusion
The German approach to the question of equivalents can be
summarized as follows:
The main basis for the determination of the scope of patent
protection is the patent claim and an understanding by a person
skilled in the art of the technical teaching embodied in such a
claim. For this purpose, a patent claim has to be interpreted in
conjunction with both the description of the invention and the
drawings. In doing so, the basic principles of function-aimed
interpretation of the terms used in the patent claim, as well as a
context-based interpretation, are to be followed. A contested
embodiment which falls within the meaning of the claim so
construed infringes the patent literally.
A patent can also be infringed if the contested embodiment
does not fall within the “literal” scope of the patent claim. This
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Id. at 648.
See BGH Mar. 12, 2002, Case No. X ZR 43/01, as translated in 34 IIC 302,
303 (Kunststoffrohrteil [Plastic Pipe]).
150
Id. at 307.
151
See Molded Curbstone, 18 IIC 795.
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See Plastic Pipe, 34 IIC at 307.
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extension in the scope of the patent is to bring about an adequate
level of protection of the inventive achievement in a way that also
ensures the highest possible level of legal certainty. This optimal
balance is achieved by protecting only those variants that the
patent claim (and not just the prior art) has made obvious to a
person skilled in the art, on the priority date. That is the case, if the
following questions 1 to 3 are answered in the affirmative and, in
addition, question 4 is answered in the negative:
1.
Does the modified embodiment solve the problem
underlying the invention by means which have objectively the same
technical effect?
2.
Was the person skilled in the art enabled by her
specialist knowledge on the priority date to find that the modified
means would have the same effect?
3.
While answering question 2, are the considerations
that the person skilled in the art applies drawn from the technical
teaching of the patent claim (so that the person skilled in the art
took the modified embodiment into account as being an equivalent
solution)?
4.
Is the modified embodiment anticipated or made
obvious by the state of the art?
V. JAPAN*
A. Introduction
Our analysis of the doctrine of equivalents in Japan has
been prepared by an insider, former Tokyo High Court Judge
Yukio Nagasawa. In his account he references another leading IP
jurist, Ryoichi Mimura, now a judge on the Tokyo IP High Court.
His role in the creation of the doctrine of equivalents is an
important part of the story for it was only in 1998 that the doctrine
of equivalents came to be accepted under Japanese law via the
famous Supreme Court decision, THK Co. v. Tsubakimoto Seiko
Co. (commonly referred to as the Ball Spline decision).153 Prior to
this, although major academic theories supported this doctrine,
judicial decisions did not.154
B. Before Ball Spline: Identity as a Technological Idea
Despite the fact that the Japanese Patent Act did not have
any provision relating to a doctrine of equivalents, major academic
theories were in favor of such a doctrine. They were of the view

153

Tsubakimoto Seiko v. THK K.K. (Ball Spline), 52 MINSH! 113 (Sup. Ct.,
Feb. 2, 1998).
154
See Judge Ryoichi Mimura, Hanrei Kaisetsu [Court Precedent Commentary],
10 SAIK" SAIBANSHO HANJI KAISETSU MINJI HEN [COMMENTS TO THE SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENTS] 112, 132 (1998) [hereinafter Hanrei Kaisetsu].
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that such a doctrine was part of equity and express statutory
provisions were not necessary to validate such a doctrine.155
Such theories proposed the following requirements for
invoking a doctrine of equivalents:
(i)
Interchangeability: The equivalent element in the
accused device achieves the same function and result as the
corresponding element of the patented invention.156
(ii)
Ease of interchangeability: Such interchangeability
as mentioned above is easily conceived of by a person of ordinary
skill in the art.157
Some scholars argued that the first requirement,
interchangeability, should be taken to be fulfilled only when the
underlying technological idea of the allegedly infringing product is
the same as the patented invention"a requirement conveniently
labeled as “identity as a technological idea.”158 They argued that
the scope of a patented invention should not be extended to cover a
different technological idea, even if the same function and the
same result could be achieved.159
Although there were academic theories to support a
doctrine of equivalents, many judges were reluctant to read a
doctrine of equivalents into Japanese patent law. Some judges
ventured to do so, however, despite the absence of a Supreme
Court precedent.160
These judges decided that “identity as a technological idea”
should be a part of the requirements for invoking the doctrine"a
different technological idea would mean that the allegedly
infringing invention was different from the patented one.161 One of
their reasons for doing so could be that these courts might have
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See id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
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Id. at 127.
158
Id. at 140.
159
See Takashi Honma, Saikousai Hanketu (mugen shudou you boru supurain
jikuuke jiken) kara mita 21seiki ni okeru wagakuni no tokkyokenn no kennri
kaishaku no doukou [Movement of Claim Interpretation of Japanese Patent
Right in the 21st Century from the Viewpoint of the Supreme Court Precedent
(Ball Spline Decision)], 48 CHIZAI KANRI [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT] 1795, 1796 (1998). Mr. Takashi Honma, a Japanese attorney,
has had significant experience with patent matters.
160
See Hanrei Kaisetu, supra note 154, at 132.
161
See Etsuji Kotani, Boru supurain saikousai hanketsu ga shimeshita kintouron
tekiyou youken no (1) to (2) no igi to kongo no kadai ni tuite [The Meaning of
Requirements (1) and (2) of the Doctrine of Equivalents Decided by the
Supreme Court Decision in the Ball Spline Case and Future Issues], in TOKKYO
SAIBAN NI OKERU KINTOURON [THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN PATENT
LITIGATION] 15, 16 (Murabayashi et al. eds., 2003). Mr. Kotani has substantial
experience as a Japanese patent attorney.
156

297

THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN VARIOUS PATENT REGIMES—DOES
ANYBODY HAVE IT RIGHT?

thought that stricter requirements built into such a doctrine would
make for easier acceptability of their decisions by the Supreme
Court. It is quite possible that these lower court judgments might
have had some influence on the Supreme Court when it decided
the Ball Spline case.
C. The Ball Spline Decision: The Essential/Inessential
Distinction
Patent litigation in Japan has changed dramatically since
the Ball Spline decision. Most patentees now invoke this doctrine
in patent litigation based on the five requirements laid down by
Ball Spline. The opinion is relatively brief and its essence is found
in the following two paragraphs. The reader should bear in mind
that by far the most important requirement of the five listed below
is requirement one162:
In determining whether an accused product
or method falls within the technical scope of a
patented invention, the technical scope of the
invention must be determined with respect to the
claim (see Patent Law Section 70 (1). If there are
elements that differ between the claim and the
accused product, the accused product and the like
cannot be said to fall within the technical scope of
the patented invention. On the other hand, even if
there are elements in the claim that differ from the
corresponding product and the like, the
corresponding product and the like may be
equivalent and may appropriately be said to fall
within the technical scope of the patented invention
if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the
differing elements are not the essential elements in
the patented invention; (2) even if the differing
elements are interchanged by elements of the
accused product and the like, the object of the
patented invention can be achieved and the same
effects can be obtained; (3) by interchanging as
above, a person of ordinary skill in the art to which
the invention pertains (hereinafter referred to as an
artisan) could have easily arrived at the accused
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This requirement underlies most of the rejections of cases in which the
doctrine of equivalents has been invoked since the Ball Spline decision. See
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN PATENT LITIGATION, supra note 161, app. at 70813 [hereinafter Ball Spline Tables] (Boru supurain saikousai hanketsu go no
kintouron ga ronjirareta hanketu ichiran [Tables of the judgments decided about
the doctrine of equivalents after the Ball Spline decision]).
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product and the like at the time of manufacture; (4)
the accused product and the like are not the same as
the known art at the time of application for patent or
could not have been easily conceived by an artisan
at the time of application for patent; and (5) there is
not any special circumstances such that the accused
product and the like are intentionally excluded from
the scope of the claim during patent prosecution).
1. Hanrei Kaisetsu by Judge Ryoichi Mimura
Judge Mimura, the main Supreme Court Researcher for the
Ball Spline decision, published his comments later as Hanrei
Kaisetsu. 163 Although the responsibility of the Supreme Court
researcher in Japan is similar to law clerks of the U.S. Supreme
Court, Japanese researchers’ reports are more influential, because
Japanese Supreme Court researchers are appointed from among
judges who have more than ten years’ experience as a judge. It is
reasonable to assume that Judge Mimura’s advice to the Supreme
Court in the Ball Spline case corresponds with his views in Hanrei
Kaisetsu.
A key aspect of Judge Mimura’s argument in Hanrei
Kaisetsu is that the positive requirements under the Ball Spline
decision can be co-related with the requirements spelt out by
scholars who were in favor of the doctrine of equivalents (hereafter
referred to as positive theory).164
The first positive requirement, “Essential Part,” is the same
as “identity as a technological idea” of the positive doctrine. The
second requirement, “Interchangeability,” and the third, “Ease of
interchangeability,” are the same as the corresponding
requirements of the positive doctrine prior to the Ball Spline
decision.165
Judge Mimura goes on to then stress that the doctrine of
equivalents is not applied to the essential part of the invention even
in the United States or Germany. 166 However, his
recommendations in Hanrei Kaisetsu have no binding power and
we find no cases supporting his view that there is an
essential/nonessential distinction in the law of the United States or
that there ever was such a distinction in the past except insofar as it

163

See Hanrei Kaisetsu, supra note 154, at 101.
Id. at 140.
165
Id. at 140 n.4.
166
Id. at 140 n.4. Judge Mimura states that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be
applied to the essential part of the invention even in the United States and
Germany, “as I mention below”. However, he does not go on to discuss this
issue “below” or in any of the following sections of his report.
164
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would be understood that an essential component can have no
equivalent in the context of the claimed invention.167 Arguably this
may be said as well for Germany. However, ironically the
essential/nonessential distinction was a part of U.K. law for many
years. The last judicial statement discussing it is found in the
opinion of Lord Justice Buckley in Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill
& Smith Ltd., where he said:
If the alleged infringement of the claim has all the
features of the claim it must infringe the claim, even
if it also incorporates other features. If it lacks one
of the features of the claim, it may or may not
infringe the claim. If the feature which is lacking is
an essential feature of the claim, there will be no
infringement; but, . . . . if it has all the essential
features of the claim, it will infringe the claim
notwithstanding the omission or substitution of an
unessential feature. . . . So it becomes necessary to
consider what distinguishes a feature of a claim
which is essential from one which is not essential. .
. . Will it be essential to the validity of the claim . . .
or will it suffice that the patentee has elected to
limit his claim by the inclusion in it of the feature in
question, thus disclaiming a monopoly in anything
not incorporating that particular feature?168
Indeed, it probably was the difficulty of determining
whether an element was essential or not that led the House of
Lords in the appeal from the decision of Lord Justice Buckley and
his fellow judges on the Court of Appeal to abandon this approach
to patent infringement altogether and to substitute therefore what it
called “purposive construction.”169

167

Judge Shitara, a judge of the Tokyo High Court, argues that the three positive
requirements of the Ball Spline decision are basically the same as the ‘functionway-result’ requirements of the U.S. test. Specifically, he argues that the U.S.
requirements of the ‘way’ prong correspond to the ‘Essential Part’ prong in
Japan (first requirement). See Judge Ryuichi Shitara, FESTO saikousai hanketu
zengo no beikoku no kintouron narabini beikoku, eikoku, doitsu oyobi wagakuni
no kintouron no kokusaiteki hikaku [The American Doctrine of Equivalents
Before and After the FESTO Supreme Court Decision and the International
Comparative Study of the Doctrine of Equivalent in the US, UK, Germany, and
Japan], in CHITEKI ZAISANKEN, SONO KEISEI TO HOGO [INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHT, ITS CREATION AND PROTECTION] 141, 155 (Toshiaki Nagai,
Kuniharu Yasue & Sachikuni Iwasaki eds., 2002). Judge Shitara, however, does
not substantiate this claim well enough.
168
Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1979] F.S.R. 619, 629-30
(C.A.) (U.K.).
169
Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183, 243 (H.L.)
(U.K.).
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2. Defining “Essential Part”
Returning now to Japan, prior to finding an apt definition
for the term “essential part,” one has to determine whether the
essential part requirement is a necessary one at all—can we
dispense with it? The Ball Spline decision, which is binding
precedent, clearly states that the essential part requirement is
necessary and until now there has not been a single judicial
decision that has dispensed with the essential part requirement. It is
extremely difficult to change precedent in Japan170 and there does
not appear to be any move by the Parliament to amend the law.
Therefore, the “essential part” requirement is here to stay and one
is forced to attempt a definition for it.
A number of authorities have tried to suggest possible
definitions of “essential part.” Judge Nishida, a presiding judge of
the Tokyo High Court, argues that the definition of “essential part”
cannot be found in the Ball Spline decision and cannot even be
extrapolated from the Ball Spline decision. 171 He explains that
there are two ways of interpreting the term “essential part”:
(i)
Literal Interpretation: As the heading
suggests, one is to interpret “essential part” literally
according to what one skilled in the art would
consider as essential parts for the claimed invention
based on the prior art and the specification.172 Thus,
one has to decide what part of the claim is essential
to the claimed invention.173
(ii)
Identity as a Technological Idea: The term
“essential part” corresponds with the “identity as a
technological idea” requirement propounded by the
positive theories prior to the Ball Spline decision.174
Under this theory, one need not decide what
specific part of the invention is “essential.”
Applying the identity as a technological idea
requirement, one would consider the technological
idea of the claimed invention and consider the

170

To change a precedent, an en banc (Grand Bench) decision of the Supreme
Court of Japan is necessary.
171
See Judge Yoshiaki Nishida, Shingai sosho ni okeru kintou no houri [The
doctrine of equivalents in infringement litigation], in CHITEKI ZAISAN SOSHO HO
[INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 182, 186 (Toshiaki Makino & Toshiaki Iimura
eds., 2002).
172
Id. at 192.
173
How does one decide “what part of the claim is essential” under Judge
Nishida’s proposal? This question is debatable and difficult for attorneys
outside Japan, and maybe in Japan too, to fully understand and grasp.
174
See Nishida, supra note 171, at 192.
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features that result in the technological idea of the
claimed invention.175
The often cited decision to extrapolate the meaning of
essential part is a decision from the Tokyo High Court.176 The key
aspects of the judgment are extrapolated below:
(i)
The “essential” part of the patented
invention is the characteristic part, which is the core
of the technological idea underlying the solution to
the technological problem addressed by specific
patented invention.177
(ii)
When deciding whether a part of the
allegedly infringing device corresponds to the
“essential part” of the patented invention, one
should not merely look narrowly at the claim, but
should take a wider view of the characteristic
principle underlying the means to solve the
problem, when compared with the prior art, and
then decide whether the principle of the means of
the accused device conforms substantially to an
identical principle underlying the patented
invention.178
The key problem with the judgment is that the definition
suggested by the court is not a clear one and is difficult to
understand. Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, a number of lower
courts have tried to follow this definition.179 Moreover, as Mr.
Jubin Matsumoto, a prominent litigator from Japan, argues, the
court definition appears to have an inbuilt contradiction.180 The
definition is composed of two different parts, as mentioned above.
While the former part is akin to an “all elements rule,” the latter
part involves considerations similar to “invention as a whole.”181 If
so, these two rules contradict each other.
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Id. at 193.
Shinwa Seisakusyo v. Fulta Electric Machinery, 1738 HANREI-JIHO 97
(Tokyo High Court, Oct. 26, 2000).
177
Id. at 98.
178
Id. at 98.
179
See Kotani, supra note 161, at 19-20; see also BESSATSU JURISUTO 152-63
(Nobuhiro Nakayama, Hidetaka Aizawa & Tetsuya Oobuchi eds., 3d ed. 2004).
180
See BESSATSU JURISUTO, supra note 179, at 159. Mr. Matsumoto commented
on a judgment decided by the Osaka High Court on April 19, 2001. Eli Lilly
Japan K.K. v. Farmacia Akucheboraagu, 2311 HANKO 2d 500 (Osaka High Ct.,
Apr. 19, 2001). The Osaka High Court’s decision on the ‘essential part’
requirement was similar to the Tokyo High Court’s decision in 2000 mentioned
above. Mr. Matsumoto’s criticism of the Osaka High Court decision would
apply to the Tokyo High Court decision.
181
BESSATSU JURISUTO, supra note 179, at 159.
176
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As mentioned above, Hanrei Kaisetsu argues that the
“essential Part” requirement is the same as the “identity as a
technological idea” concept propounded by the positive theories
prior to the Ball Spline decision. If so, the former half of the Tokyo
High Court judgment contradicts even Hanrei Kaisetsu, because
the former half says that the essential part of the patented invention
is the characteristic part, which is the “core” of the technological
idea.182 This focus on the core appears to stand opposed to the way
that one would identify the patented invention as a technological
idea, as a whole.
Given that in this imperfect world some definition must be
found for “essential part” before there can be a proper function
doctrine of equivalence in Japan, and thus far no clear definition
has been put forth, the authors suggest that the decision should be
based on the claim and the prior art.
Illustratively, if the patented invention is composed of
elements A and B, and the element A is part of prior art, it can be
concluded that it is the addition of element B that makes the
invention patentable. Therefore, element B should be taken to be
the “essential part” of the invention. Consider a change in the
above example where both A and B are part of prior art. The
invention in this case is a combination of A and B, a combination
that was not obvious to a skilled person. Here, neither A nor B are
“essential parts” of the invention"rather, the “essential part” is the
combination. Consequently, the doctrine of equivalents can be
applied to both A and B. This would be true even if B were not part
of the prior art if had B been part of the prior art the combination
would still be non-obvious. The advantage of this proposal is that it
is both simple and predictable, because the claim has clear
elements where the specification does not.
D. Conclusion
Between the Ball Spline decision and August 2002, there
were 115 cases in which the doctrine of equivalent was invoked.
Of these cases, the doctrine was applied and affirmed only in nine
cases, which translates roughly to a mere 7.8% of the total cases
where the doctrine was invoked. In other words, the court rejected
the application of this doctrine in 92.2% of the cases.183 The main
reason underlying the aversion of the Japanese lower courts
towards applying the doctrine of equivalents is that the “essential
part” requirement is unclear. Had the “essential part” requirement

182
183

See Hanrei Kaisetsu, supra note 154, at 140 n.4.
See Ball Spline Tables, supra note 162.
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not existed, the doctrine of equivalents could have been applied to
many more cases.
The current definition most relied on by courts seems to be
based on the “all elements rule.” But Hanrei Kaisetsu argues that
the “essential part” requirement is the same as the “identity as a
technological idea” concept, which in turn is substantially similar
to the “an invention as a whole” concept.184 As a result of this
theoretical confusion, the lower court decisions are a kind of a
strange mixture of the “essential part” doctrine similar to the “all
elements rule” on the one hand and the “identity as a technological
idea” doctrine (and thereby the “an invention as a whole”) on the
other.
As highlighted above, an en banc (Grand Bench) decision
of the Supreme Court of Japan is necessary to change the Ball
Spline decision which mandates an “essential part” requirement.
This is very difficult and the Congress is not likely to act in the
near future. The “essential part” requirement is therefore here to
stay for some time.
An optimal way to limit the adverse effects of the “essential
part” requirement is to define it as clearly and objectively as
possible, so as to provide for more predictability in the application
of the doctrine of equivalents. From this viewpoint, the author’s
proposal for defining the ‘essential part’ requirement is a robust
one. It is hoped that future decisions would take the simple
definition proposed in this paper into account.
VI.
CONCLUSION:
HYPOTHETICALS

WORKING

WITH

KIRIN-AMGEN

If one applies the laws of each jurisdiction to a classic
example of a trivial change in a device—for instance, replacing a
conical cavity for carrying coal with a pyramidal cavity that has
the exact same purpose and effect of evenly distributing the weight
of the coal with a low center of gravity—these jurisdictions will
not significantly differ. A U.S. court would, and did, find the
device to be an infringing equivalent.185 A U.K. court would likely
find that such a change was obvious at the date of publication and
that the patentee did not intend the term “conical” to only apply to
rounded cavities. A German court would likely conclude that the
teaching of the patent—that the conical cavity is designed to result
in an even weight distribution of coal—meant that a person skilled
in the art would have taken the embodiment into account as an

184
185

See Hanrei Kaisetsu, supra note 154, at 140 n.4.
Winans v. Deadmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343 (1854).
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equivalent solution, and a Japanese court would find the change
inessential and obviously equivalent to one skilled in the art.186
That these jurisdictions would give the same answer to the
question of infringement for such a simple case, however, does not
mean that their solutions to the question of equivalents are the
same. For a true comparison, these solutions must be applied to a
more complex situation. One of the best ways to understand the
doctrine of equivalence and the various approaches to it is
therefore to work with the facts of Kirin-Amgen. It involved one of
the most famous inventions of the biotech era, the identification of
the gene coding for human erythropoietin upon which Amgen built
one of the largest biotechnology companies in the world. The key
to the Amgen invention was that Amgen was able to isolate the
gene coding for human erythropoietin.187 Once Amgen had the
gene, then it was routine, but not easy, to insert the gene into
Chinese hamster ovary (CHO) cells and get those cells to make
human erythropoietin.188 This invention, made in the early 1980s,
was held not to be obvious by the Federal Circuit in 1991, Amgen
Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.189 At the time of the invention,
the only known method of using an isolated gene to make its
corresponding protein was to insert the isolated gene into a cell.
The cell might well be termed a “host cell” for the gene came from
outside the cell. A few years later a new technology initiated the
era of gene activation. Instead of inserting a gene into a cell in
order to have the cell manufacture the protein coded by the gene,
gene activation technology activates human cells to make
erythropoietin on their own.190 After all, every human cell already
contains the gene that codes for all human proteins. As applied to
erythropoietin, once one can locate the erythropoietin gene within
the genome of the cell then the new gene activation technique
employs a promoter that it inserted into the human cells which
turns the cell’s erythropoietin genes on thereby causing the cells to
make human erythropoietin.191 With the advent of this new gene
activation technology, the U.K. courts encountered the issue of
186

A separate issue may present itself if one thinks the patent drafter in this
situation should have drafted his claims to literally cover this embodiment.
However, the discussion of this problem is outside the bounds of this Article. In
any event, it is reasonable to assume that sloppy drafting cannot account for all
equivalents that do not involve after-arising technology, inventive steps, or
essential elements, and therefore, for these simple cases, these jurisdictions
overlap.
187
Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005]
R.P.C. 9, ¶ 8.
188
Id. ¶ 9.
189
927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
190
Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 9.
191
Id. ¶ 6.
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whether the cell that receives a promoter to make its own human
erythropoietin may be called a “host cell.” After all that cell did
not receive the human erythropoietin gene isolated by Amgen, but
it did receive a promoter from outside the cell. Nevertheless, the
House concluded that it was not a “host cell” and the House made
it abundantly clear that this is where it felt the analysis should
end.192
Arguably Kirin-Amgen on the facts was an easy case since
the invention was finding the erythropoietin gene using two probes
in a library of genes, a method of discovery that was viewed as an
inventive step.193 The gene activation technology did not require
copies of the actual gene as did the standard method disclosed in
the patent, but it did need knowledge of its nucleic acid sequence
in order to put the exogenous promoter in the right place with
respect to the erythropoietin gene that was already in the genome
of the cell. It is easy to see that this was not enough to convince a
court that the accused process should be considered an
infringement. But what if a different inventor invented a machine
which could do the same thing with an exogenous gene as the
CHO cells of the patent? The new machine could be the subject of
many of its own patents. What if one could not reasonably foresee
the invention of such a machine so the patent drafter did not see a
need for using a broader term than “host cell,” such as “means for
making a protein upon the receipt of a gene coding for said
protein?” Would the House of Lords have been so quick to reject
the need for a doctrine of equivalents? How would such a situation
be treated by other courts?
Clearly if the invention of such a machine was not
reasonably foreseeable, then it likely would in the United States be
considered an infringement when substituted for a CHO cell.194
Similarly in Japan it should be clear that the CHO cell was not an
essential feature since CHO cell lines were conventional
technology at the time of Amgen’s invention. The situation in
Germany would be different because when the specification was
read by one skilled in the art at the time the patent issued, the
skilled man would not envision substituting a host machine for a
host cell.
Changing the hypothetical ever so slightly is even more
illuminating. Let us assume that at the time the claims were drafted
the host machine technology was just being developed. It worked
but was quite expensive and no commercial process was possible
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Id. ¶ 58.
Id. ¶ 117.
194
Unless, of course, the nature of the after-arising technology meant that the
“way” part of the doctrine of equivalents test was not satisfied.
193
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with such a host machine. After the patent issued a major change
was made to the machine which rendered it a practical substitute
for mammalian cells in the production of proteins from exogenous
genes. At that point many in the biotech industry switched to this
new machine technology.
In the United States if there were no estoppel, this new host
machine would most likely be viewed as an equivalent. If,
however, there was an estoppel with respect to the “host cell”
limitation, then the picture is cloudier as it can fairly be argued that
the idea of a host machine was reasonably foreseeable as a
substitute for host cells even though the existing host machine did
not work very well. In the United Kingdom there of course would
be no infringement. In Germany the question would be whether the
existence of a poorly functioning host machine would be enough to
convince one of skill in the art that the claim was meant to cover
host machines. Then the newly improved host machine of the
accused process would simply be a dependent (improvement)
invention on the invention covered by the claim. In Japan the
question would still turn on the essential/nonessential distinction
but the likely result would again be infringement. It is for the
reader to answer then the question of whether any of these
jurisdictions have it right.
There is some consensus that the narrowly read, literal
meaning of the words of a claim is not enough to protect inventors
against theft of their invention. However, the solution to this
problem, the doctrine of equivalents, is by no means clear cut, and
has thus developed quite differently in different jurisdictions.
The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and
Germany each provide us with a different approach to the doctrine
of equivalents. The United States arguably provides the broadest
protection under the doctrine, counting foreseeable equivalents as
infringing so long as they are not equivalent to an amended aspect
of a claim, and unforeseeable equivalents as always infringing—
with the caveat that unforeseeable equivalents have difficulty
passing the “way” aspect of the equivalents test. The United
Kingdom does not consider itself to have a doctrine of equivalents;
rather, it conducts a similar analysis under purposive claim
construction. This analysis may or may not find an unforeseeable,
after-arising technology encompassed in the claim, depending on
the generality of the language of the claim. An unforeseeable (or
foreseeable) equivalent that cannot be found within the meaning of
the language of a claim cannot infringe. This requirement may
place too much of an expectation on the drafters of a claim,
without giving significantly more guidance on patent scope.
Japanese law allows for foreseeable and unforeseeable equivalents
by basing its test of interchangeability on the time of manufacture
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of the accused device, but offers another way to narrow application
of the doctrine: if the variant employed constitutes an essential part
of the claim, then the accused device does not infringe. This
requirement has injected much confusion into the application of
the doctrine of equivalents in Japan. In contrast, Germany has
declared that its test for equivalents be based on a specialist’s
knowledge at the time of priority, and therefore has established a
clear doctrine of equivalents that does not cover unforeseeable
equivalents or suffer from other major problems. Should the
doctrine of equivalents be broad enough to include unforeseeable
equivalents? Is such an inclusion worthwhile if it brings
uncertainty to the doctrine, or renders protection too broad? Is
foreseeability even the correct line to draw, or should the doctrine
focus on an essential/inessential distinction? It is for the reader to
answer the question of whether any of these jurisdictions have it
right.
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